Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990

Farshad A. Araghi
Florida Atlantic University

“Only connect.”
— E. M. Forster

INTRODUCTION

In his introduction to Peasants and Peasant Societies, Teodor Shanin (1987, p. 8) warns us that “any images of peasant household or a peasant community with no ‘external’ ties are conceptual constructs, exceptions, miscomprehensions or caricatures. . . . The massive extension in intensity of those ties during the last decade made them more central than ever to any effort at the understanding of the peasantry.” Despite this caveat, most studies ordinarily allow the geography of analysis (i.e., the broader social context) to be specified by a given geography of observation (i.e., the location of particular peasantry). The microlevel studies that focus on the peasantry of a country without attempting to conceptualize the global connection number in the thousands. Even Shanin’s two collections of essays ([1971] 1987, 1990) contain only a few studies that seek to understand local social phenomena as simultaneously global processes. Just as peasants have played their part in the process of nation-state building in this century (e.g., in Mexico [1910], Russia [1905-1917], China [1921-1949], Vietnam [1945-1975], Algeria [1954], and Cuba [1958]) so nation-centered analyses prevail in peasant studies. 1 Although a number of authors (Vandergeest 1989; Alavi 1987 p. 189; Saul and Woods 1987 p. 81; Foweraker 1978 p. 139) have noted the relevance of the global context, this is barely explored in their analyses. 2 Surveying studies on the transformation of the European peasancies between 1500 and 1900, Bryan Roberts (1990 p. 365) suggests that “similar work needs to be done on contemporary trends in developing countries.”

As important as it is to recognize the global dimension of the local social processes of our time, my aim is not to substitute abstract globalization for localism. As Eduardo Archetti and Svein Aass (1987, p. 125) have suggested, the analysis advanced in this article is informed by a world-historical view that seeks to conceptualize social phenomena as local-global processes within a specified historical context (McMichael 1990; Tomich 1990; McMichael and Buttel 1990). In this perspective, local and global processes (re)constitute each other through political mediation of the state (e.g., Llambi 1990; Friedmann 1993; Buttel 1989). Elsewhere I argue that considering the role of ideology as a constitutive social force would

Please direct all correspondence to Farshad Araghi, Sociology, Division of Social Sciences, Florida Atlantic University, 2912 College Ave. Davie, FL 33314.e mail: araghi@acc.fau.edu

The Sociological Quarterly, Volume 36, Number 2, pages 337-368.
Copyright © 1995 by The Midwest Sociological Society.
All rights of reproduction in any form requested.
ISSN: 0038-0253.
advance such a perspective (Araghi 1991). To use Anthony Giddens’s terminology (1984),
the world-historical approach is concerned with the analysis of structuration of macro and
micro social processes. Thus, by conceiving of the world economy as a social and political
process, the world-historical approach eschews the main danger in globalist theorizing, that is
the problem of reification. By rejecting teleology, the world-historical approach provides a
nonfunctionalist framework for analysis of social change. By avoiding essentialism, this ap-
proach allows for a nondeterminist interpretation of social phenomena as historically con-
structed processes.

Working within such a framework, my aim in this article is to analyze what I call “global
depauperization,” a concept abstracted from the social history of our time. It expresses the
experience of the Third World peasantry between 1945 and 1990, when an increasing
number of people who were involved in agriculture with direct access to the production of
their means of subsistence became rapidly and massively concentrated in urban locations. In
1950, only 29 percent of the total world population, and 16 percent of the Third World popu-
lation lived in urban areas. By the year 2000 nearly half of the world population and 41
percent of the Third world population will live in urban areas. In Latin America and the
Middle East approximately 70 percent of the population is already urbanized (UN 1988; 1990).
As Eric Hobsbawm (1992, p. 56) asserts, this period “saw the most spectacular, rapid,
far-reaching, profound, and worldwide social change in global history. . . [This] is the first
period in which the peasantry became a minority, not merely in industrially developed coun-
tries, in several of which it had remained very strong, but even in the Third World countries.”
Spatially, as I will argue, global depauperization is expressed in deruralization (depopulation
and decline of the rural areas of the world) and overurbanization (massive concentration of
peoples and activities in growing urban centers of the world), both of which are in turn reflec-
tive of a pattern of differentiation of geographical space particular to the post-World War II
development of world capitalism. Figure 1 captures the global dimension of deruralization in
this period.

Before developing my argument, however, I wish to critically examine the debate on the so-
called “peasant question.” This is a century-old debate concerning the “future” of the peas-
antry under capitalism. Originating in late nineteenth-century Europe, the debate has since
continued under vastly different world-historical contexts. A critical review of this debate
will, I hope, clarify the methodology as well as the substantive analysis of this article.

**QUESTIONING THE “PEASANT QUESTION”: REVIEW OF A DEBATE**

The main protagonists in this debate are, on the one hand, those who have argued that the
inevitable expansion of capitalism will lead to the disappearance of the peasantry from the
countryside. Thus, sooner or later, rapidly or slowly, directly or indirectly, peasants will be
transformed into wageworkers and capitalist farmers in the countryside. This is the so-called
disappearance thesis. On the other hand, the advocates of the “permanence thesis”
(campesinistas in the Latin American debate) have argued that peasant societies, for various
reasons, do not abide by the “laws” of industrial capitalism and that, on the contrary, peasant
economies have a developmental logic of their own that results in the survival of the peasantry
and its conditions of reproduction in the countryside. I will comment more specifically on
each of these theoretical orientations.
Modernity and the "Disappearance Thesis"

First, let us consider modernity and the "disappearance thesis." As the worldview of the age of industrialism, nineteenth-century developmentalism drew a sharp distinction between traditional and modern societies. Traditional societies were Ideal-typically designated as simple, undifferentiated, and rural (gemeinschaft), while modern societies were designated as differentiated, complex, industrial, and urban (gesellschaft). More importantly, progressionist rationality, in rejecting its own past posited a historical movement away from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft—from undifferentiated wholes towards complex and heterogeneous ones. Tel-eology, therefore, became an integral component of modern theories of social change. Such was the hegemony of developmentalist/teleological thinking in nineteenth-century Europe that in the end even Marxism, which was in part a critique of modernity, could not resist adopting its language (e.g., Marx [1859] 1971; Engels [1884] 1972)—although, as the growing literature shows (Sayer 1887; Shanin 1984), Marx was certainly both grappling with problems of evolutionism and concerned with developing an open-ended historical sociology. In the main, however, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels ([1848] 1975, p.38) explicitly equate peoples of non-Western origins with "nations of peasants" and those nations with "barbarian and semi-barbarian countries," which "civilization" was of necessity subordinating to itself. In the industrializing west, too, the peasantry, as Marx remarked, was "the class which, within civilization, represent[ed] barbarism" (Marx [1850] 1924, p.91). As such, peasants did not and could not make history; in their capacity to bring the past into the future, as Marx set himself to show in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, they temporarily interrupted the course
of history. Incapable of even representing itself (Marx [1852] 1972, p. 106), the peasantry was a class with no future. This line of thinking was not peculiar to Marxism: Émile Durkheim, in his analysis of the division of labor, and Max Weber, in his analysis of increasing economization and rationalization of social life, generally relegated the primitive/traditional/rural phenomena to a peripheral and moribund status.

The culture of modernity, therefore, provided the intellectual context in which Marxism originally posed the disappearance thesis—a thesis that argued for the necessary dissolution of the peasantry as a logical consequence of the advancing process of class differentiation in the rural areas of (European) nations. The small peasant, in Engels’s words, “like every other survival of the past mode of production, is hopelessly doomed. He is a future proletarian” ([1894] 1977, p. 460). Thus, within the discourse of progressionist Marxism, “differentiation was destiny.” If there was a question, it was not about the inevitability and the logical necessity of peasant differentiation, it was about its timing: will the peasants disappear before the impending socialist revolutions in Europe? The answer, of course, was in the negative, because, by the end of the nineteenth century, it was apparent that even in Europe capitalism’s modernizing/rationalizing/civilizing mission was far from its “conclusion.” The question, then, was what should the socialist parties do about the peasantry in the upcoming political conflicts. Posed by Engels in The Peasant Question in France and Germany ([1894] 1977) this issue came to be known as the “peasant question” (later the “agrarian question”). At the heart of this problematic was (1) a teleological assumption about the transient character of the peasant population and (2), at that historical conjuncture, a political and pragmatic concern with the fact that the peasantries were still “a very essential factor of the population, production and political power” (Engels [1894] 1977, p. 457).

Teleology, together with the emerging political interest in defining (a segment of) the peasantry as agents of revolutionary change, rendered an intellectual atmosphere in which the two most influential analyses, V. I. Lenin’s The Development of Capitalism In Russia ([1899] 1960), and Karl Kautsky’s The Agrarian Question ([1899] 1988) were carried out. Both published in 1899, these works further explicated the “peasant question” (and in turn influenced the development of later debate and analysis). While Kautsky, who relied upon data from Germany, France, Britain, and the United States, aimed at refining the original disappearance thesis by recasting it as a tendency subject to countervailing influences (Kautsky [1899] 1988, p. 449), Lenin’s intent was to show that capitalism, contrary to what the Narodnick ideology declared, was in fact developing in the Russian countryside and that the Russian peasantry was a differentiated and differentiating entity. Thus, “the old peasantry [was] not only ‘differentiating,’ it [was] being completely dissolved, it [was] ceasing to exist, it [was] being ousted by absolutely new types of rural inhabitants. . . a class of commodity producers in agriculture and a class of agricultural wage-workers” (Lenin [1899] 1960, p.174). Based on this analysis, Lenin linked the proletarianization of the peasantry to the growth of a home market and, later, forcefully argued for a reconceptualization of the role of the peasantry in the making of history. 5 I will return to this point later.

With the rise of Third World developmentalism in the post-World War II period, there was a renewed interest in extending the late nineteenth-century debate on the “peasant question” to the Third World. While much less concerned with the politics of the “peasant question,” the proponents of the disappearance thesis in the Third World have retained both its teleology and the nation-state orientation (see, for example, on Bangladesh, Rahman 1986; on India, Patnaik 1987; 1990; on Uganda, Mamdani 1987; on Egypt, Richards 1982; on Turkey, Seddon and
Margulies (1984). The progressionist frame of reference and the presumption of an end-state can be seen, for example, in the work of T. J. Byress (1986, p. ix) who notes that “a central distinguishing characteristic of economic backwardness is an unresolved agrarian question.” Such backwardness exists when capitalism has not “yet rooted out and destroyed . . . non-capitalist [agrarian] relations” (Byress 1991, p. 7). The matter of peasant differentiation, Byress (1986, p. x) points out, is central to understanding the nature of the agrarian question in backward countries. Put simply, progress from backwardness to civilization involves the “resolution” of the “peasant question.” In the context of the Third World where peasants have been numerous, the disappearance thesis has been qualified. The fundamental assumptions underlying this perspective, however, have not changed.6 There are three important variants of the original thesis.

To provide some flexibility to deterministic formulations, one variant of the disappearance thesis allows for “historical variation.” The structure of the argument, however, remains teleological, because the end-state toward which social change processes are alleged to be working or evolving is presumed (or deduced from the analysis of a prior “completed” case). The end point is fixed, though the roads or paths to that point are historically variable. Byress’s recent contribution is a splendid example of such an attempt, for his work implies that although peasant differentiation is inevitable, it follows a great variety of historically negotiated paths. One value of such an exercise, as Byress (1991, p.60) maintains, is “to emphasize the dangers of a narrowly dogmatic view which assumes that only a single transition (or maybe one or two forms of transition) is possible.” Certainly, a “many paths” model is “better” than the “one path” or “two paths” models. In fact, given the wealth of current historiographic research, arguments supporting the one or two paths models are hardly tenable anymore. The central problem with this version of the disappearance thesis, then, is precisely its neo-evolutionist notion of “destined pathways.”

A second variant of the differentiation thesis agrees that peasants have not disappeared as (fast as) they should have but accounts for this by referring to the positive consequences of a peasant economy for capital accumulation. If the “traditional” sector survives, it is because it serves the needs of the “modern” sector. It is therefore to the advantage of the modern sector to maintain or preserve the traditional sector in order to provide itself with cheap supplies of labor on a continuing basis. Kautsky’s work ([1899] 1988) represents an early attempt to qualify the disappearance thesis in this way. One element of his more complex argument maintained that the preservation of the peasant sector was functional to the “needs” of capitalist reproduction ([1899] 1988). Other authors have since developed arguments that emphasize the functionality of the peasant sector as the reproducer of cheap labor for the urban sector or the adjoining capitalist enterprises (Rey 1975; Meillassoux 1981; Arrighi 1973; Wolpe 1972). Alain de Janvry (1981) most elegantly states this point of view when he argues that the existence of “sectoral disarticulation” and “functional dualism” in Third World economies explain the “systemic logic” of peasant persistence. Functional dualism is contradictory, and it will eventually become dysfunctional as national economies become articulated (de Janvry 1981, p. 32-45); full proletarianization of the peasantry will ensue. De Janvry notes that “there is no theoretical possibility for peasants to remain in their contradictory class position. However lengthy and painful the process may be, their future is full incorporation into one or the other of the two essential classes of capitalism.” Functionalism, as we know, is a form of teleology that, by invoking post hoc reasoning, explains the existence of social phenomena by their consequences or effects (Ryan 1970). Besides, as the early critics of de Janvry have noted, the
extended reproduction of capitalism does not depend on a general or universal necessity to either maintain or destroy precapitalist modes of production (Goodman and Redclift 1982, p. 62; Assies 1987; see also Bradly 1975).⁷

According to a third version of the disappearance thesis, those who reject the reality of peasant differentiation in the Third World countrysides fail to distinguish between the “essence” and the “appearance.” What has happened, of course, is not peasant differentiation in its classic form but a form of “differentiation in disguise.” Drawing on Marx’s original distinction between formal and real subsumption of labor to capital ((1866) 1977, p. 934-1084), the proponents of this version of the disappearance thesis argue that what appears to be an undifferentiated mass of peasantry is, essentially speaking, a differentiated entity. From this perspective, peasant commodity producers are in fact concealed wagemakers (Banaji 1977, p.36). In Jairus Banaji’s (1990, p. 298) formulation, we must discern the “social function of wage-labor behind its misleading forms of appearance.” Similarly, Tom Brass (1990, p. 298) argues for the existence of a class of de facto proletarians on the Latin American countrysides. Although Brass has correctly critiqued Nola Reinhardt (1988) for her “peasant essentialism,” he fails to see that his own argument is a variant of “wage-labor essentialism.”⁸ In addition to eventualist assumptions, one important problem with the third version of the disappearance thesis is its reductionism, which stems from an improper understanding of the relation between theoretical categories and empirical phenomena. The search for a disguised proletariat, in other words, is only mandated by a positivist conception of the category of wage labor.

Although I have discussed these orientations separately, they are not mutually exclusive. Elements of each may be combined in an argument (e.g., de Janvry and Garramon 1977). Such a synthesis is possible precisely because these are differing arguments within the same discourse united by both neo-evolutionary assumptions and the acceptance of the national economy as the appropriate unit of analysis. Remarkably, as we shall see, the proponents of the persistence thesis—those on the opposite side of the debate—share both the essentialism and the nation-state orientation of their opponents.

The Romantic Reaction: The Permanence Thesis

The proponents of the permanence thesis argue that the economic laws that govern peasant societies are theoretically distinct from those that govern capitalist societies. Peasant societies persist because they operate according to a logic that enables them to resist the expansionary forces of capitalism. The main point of disagreement between the proponents of the persistence and the disappearance theses is not so much the disintegrating nature of the forces of capitalism as it is the inherent ability of rural/peasant societies to resist those forces. The intellectual origin of this position goes back to the late nineteenth-century debates between Marxism and Russian populism (Walicki 1969; Shanin 1984). Inspired by the thoughts of Nicolai Chernyshevskii and Aleksandr Herzen, the Russian populists (e.g., Nicolai Danielson) agreed with one side of Marx’s critique of capitalism, that it was a destructive (but not simultaneously a progressive) force and that it was neither possible nor desirable for capitalism to develop in Russia—a thesis whose refutation was at the heart of both G. V. Plekhanov’s anticritique⁹ in the mid-1880s and of Lenin’s The Development of Capitalism in Russia ([1899] 1960). Thus, if the dominance of capitalism and industrial urbanism, along with the hegemony of the idea of progress in late nineteenth-century England, provided the social context for the rise of the disappearance thesis it was antimodernity, expressed as anti-indus-
trialism and antiurbanism in late nineteenth-century Russian populism that characterized the intellectual climate of the rise of the permanence thesis.

The most original and sophisticated statement of the permanence thesis came from A. V. Chayanov. In The Theory of Peasant Economy ([1925] 1987), Chayanov formulated a specific theory of what may be called a “peasant mode of production.” Drawing on marginalist economics to address the problems of progressionist Marxism, Chayanov’s aim was to show that Marx’s listing of modes of production in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy ([1859] 1971) could be expanded to include the peasant economy. Diametrically opposed to the prognosis of evolutionary Marxists, which stated that peasant production was but a transitory form of petty commodity production, Chayanov treated peasant production as an economic system in its own right, with laws of production and reproduction that enabled it to outcompete agrarian capitalism. Chayanov’s main thesis is that in the absence of Marx’s category of “socially necessary labor time,” the determinants of peasant productive behavior are subjective, rather than objective. In a peasant economy, therefore, a peasant’s aim is not to maximize profit, for he or she is not, to use Weber’s term, a “rational” actor. Instead, peasants aim at maximizing the satisfaction of family needs to the point that their subjective distaste for manual labor outweighs the possible increase in output (Chayanov [1925] 1987). Since peasants produce in order to live, rather than to profit, they persist under conditions that capitalists would not.

Gavin Kitching (1989, p. 46-47) classifies Chayanov’s work as “neo-populist,” describing it as a sophisticated attempt at restating the populist position while accounting for the new conditions in the Russian countryside in the 1920s. Shanin (1990, p. 331), on the other hand, rejects such a designation as a miscomprehension of Chayanov’s work. In general, Kitching is right. I should note here, however, that there are passages in The Theory of Peasant Economy that suggest that Chayanov was aware of the world-historical specificity of his argument and that he was analyzing Russia’s agrarian conditions in the context of the breakdown of the world market after World War I, and in the context of the implementation of New Economic Policies in the 1920s.10 Daniel Thorner’s (1987) “Peasant Economy as a Category in History,” for example, is sympathetic to such an interpretation of Chayanov. Read in this way, Chayanov’s work adds to our knowledge of the historical forms of small-scale production and their workings. The second interpretation, in contrast, sees in Chayanov’s work a timeless and universal argument for peasant persistence. As the title of his work suggests, Chayanov has a strong tendency to advance just such a thesis. It is this reading that is essentialist, which promotes a sui generis conception of national peasantries, and whose origins can be traced to Narodnichesov. It is also this reading that predominates in the work of scholars who have tried to explain peasant persistence in the Third World in the post World War II era (Vergopoulos 1978; Taussig 1978; Reinhardt 1988; Attwood 1992; for views on the Middle East that blend essentialist with orientalist assumptions, see Glavanis and Glavanis 1990). As Peter Gibbon and Michael Neocosmos (1985) argue,11 and as Luis Llambi (1988) demonstrates, an analysis of commodity producing peasantries need not be couched in deterministic, essentialist, and ahistorical terms (Mann 1990; Mooney 1988). Such presumptions are the central problem with the persistence thesis, which, in its search for the essential logic of persistence, abstracts from the changing world market contexts.

In contrast to these two approaches, in this article I propose to analyze depeasantization in its world-historical context. In order to avoid the methodological problems with both the persistence and disappearance theses, I specify the process of transformation of the Third
World peasants by outlining the postwar international order (and disorder) and locating depeasantization within that changing global complex. As I will argue at length, there are two phases of depeasantization, consistent with a particular periodization of the world economy: (1) 1945 to ca. 1973, the period of the construction of the world market and the establishment and institutionalization of the new global political and economic order under the hegemony of the American state, and (2) ca. 1973 to the present, the period of the collapse of that order as reflected in the ongoing process of reorganization of the world political and economic institutions (Arrighi 1994; Block 1977; Chase-Dunn 1989; Harvey 1989). I will discuss each phase of depeasantization with the aim of contextualizing it, by linking each phase with the major political and dominant ideological currents and movements (e.g., nationalism and internationalism, decolonization and globalization, communism and anticommunism, modernity and postmodernity, etc.) within the specified periods.

**POSTWAR NATIONALISM AND DEPEASANTIZATION, 1945-1973**

On a worldwide scale the political and ideological competition of two broadly distinguished categories of nationalisms — “socialist” or “state” nationalisms and “pro-West” or “promarket” nationalisms (for the lack of better terms)—mediated the process of expansion of the world economy in the period extending from the late 1940s to the late 1980s. There was competition within each group of nation-states, but it was mainly competition between the two camps that provided the social context of the construction of the world market.

The emergence of national liberation movements opened up a new arena for competition between the two camps. This competition was expressed politically in the cold war in the form of rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. How could this new and powerful wave of nationalisms in areas as vast as Africa, Asia, and Latin America be tackled? There were three possible approaches: a reactive response, which was followed by the Europeans, mainly by Britain and France; an inactive stance, which was the favored approach by the isolationist current in the United States; and a proactive response, which had already been adopted by the Soviet Union, and also became the favored response of the internationalist currents within the United States. From the viewpoint of the internationalists, who had by now a political representation within the American state, both the reactive and inactive approaches provided no solution at all; in practice they meant either a return to the reconstruction of the old colonial blocks—an idea whose time had already passed, and, in any event, one that was quite incompatible with the U.S. hegemonic project—or, even worse, and more probable, a rapid expansion of “socialist” nationalisms on a global scale. Thus, both the Soviet and the American states favored the proactive approach, the difference being that the Soviet state, for historic reasons, had in its possession a clearly defined and programmatic solution to the problem at hand. The key to this was the linking of the “national and colonial question” with both the “peasant question” and the workers’ movement. Lenin ([1907] 1971c, p 155) formulated this in the context of Russian conditions well before the October revolution:13 “The agrarian question is the basis of the bourgeois revolution in Russia and determines the specific national character of this revolution.” Reversing the stance of the Marxism of the First International (in which peasants were conceived of as a reactionary force), Lenin argued for the political importance of bringing the rural, urban, and national movements in relation with each other as they were emerging in the early decades of the twentieth century. Explaining the need for a lasting alliance with the peasantry, Lenin urged carrying the “class struggle into the countryside” ([1901] 1971a, p. 12) through an active support of the peasant
movement and its demands, such as land confiscation. With the victory of the October revolution, which was based on such principles, this formulation found a prominent place in the CPSU’s policy making apparatus.

In the United States, the New Deal administration had a clear vision of the basic framework of the postwar economic order as far as the interests of American and European capital and labor were concerned, but it was less clear about the place of the postcolonial states and their peasantry in that order.

The Zapata movement and its crucial role in the transformation of the Mexican land tenure system in the aftermath of the 1910 revolution was noticed. It was not, however, until the Chinese revolution (1948) that Harry Truman declared the Point Four program in 1949, just as the Cuban revolution of 1959 spurred the adoption of the Act of Bogota in 1960 and the formation of the Alliance for Progress the next year during John F. Kennedy’s administration. Hence, just as the power of labor between 1933 and 1941 (Davis 1980) succeeded in incorporating the demands of an important section of the American working class in the new (intensive) regime of accumulation in the form of collective bargaining rights and higher wage levels (Aglietta 1979; Braverman 1975), the demands of the Third World peasantry and urban nationalists had to be acknowledged. At a time when anticolonial movements were rapidly growing all over the underdeveloped world, “promarket” nationalism had to be incorporated, for the alternative was the expansion of “socialist” nationalism.

This was done by acceding to national developmentalist programs that emphasized balanced internal growth. In the 1950s, these programs were developed in the United Nations by the Economic Council for Latin America under the leadership of Raul Prebisch. That formula was centered on inward-oriented growth strategies that viewed import-substitution industrialization, as opposed to outward-oriented agricultural production for export, not only as the key to national development but also as a strategy that contained the economic content of a program for national independence. This was largely an illusion, and I will later discuss depeasantization in its first phase with specific reference to the contradictions of nationalist developmentalism. Here we must note the social basis of these ideological illusions. First, import-substitution industrialization was not specifically a postwar invention. Its origins went back to the 1930s, when countries such as Argentina, Iran, Brazil, and Chile experienced rapid industrialization following their abandonment of export-led growth. This happened in the context of the rise of protectionism in the North which in effect forced these countries to give up agricultural production for export in favor of domestic industrialization between 1930 and 1945. What was later forgotten was that “balanced” national development had a world-economic dimension in that it had occurred in connection with a particular phase in the development of the world economy (the breakdown of the world market, domestic production and protection of agriculture in the core countries, rapid decline of world prices for agricultural commodities, disinvestment in the South). Second, postcolonial nationalisms drew on the experience of the United States between the 1890s and 1945 when a growing degree of domestic integration of agriculture and industry characterized U.S. economic development in the era of declining British hegemony. This is argued by Harriet Friedmann and Philip McMichael (1989, p. 111) who point out that “as the hegemonic power, American capitalism became the model for post-war theories of development applied to the Third World.”

For more than twenty-five years after the war, the American model defined the framework in which the official discourse on development was carried out in the United Nations and in the U.S. public and private Third World development research institutions. The ideal of redu-
plication of the American experience guided the U.S. approach to Third World agriculture in general and the “peasant question” in particular. The Green Revolution and land reform were, respectively, interventionist strategies adopted in the midst of social and political struggles to realize that ideal. Both strategies were abandoned after 1973-1974 with the fall from grace of nationalist developmentalism20 (Atkins 1988; Griffin 1979; Cleaver 1979). I shall return to this point later.

How the American model guided the development of plans responding to peasant unrest in Asia and Latin America is particularly revealing of the ideological dimension of developmentalist thinking in this era. The “ideal” solution, though not necessarily the practice, was land reform American style, that is, the creation of family-sized farm units (as opposed to collectivization à la state-socialists). This, of course, was a concept rooted in America’s own past and ongoing experience with family farming, along with a dosage of cold war anticommunism expressed as concerns for “the dignity of the individual” and the crucial importance of the Family Farm phenomenon for the “future of democracy in the world.” Politically, the idea was to assimilate peasant unrest through state-sponsored agrarian reform programs in order to achieve three objectives: (1) to curb the expansion of “state-socialist” nationalisms, when the alliance of rural and urban forces had proven to be a practically effective way of conducting national revolutions and capturing of the state power; (2) to instigate agricultural growth with state support, which would then become a source of domestic demand for industry21 (Rostow, 1963a, p. 310; 1964, p. 180; 1971); and (3) to dismantle local serfdoms, where they were seen as a hindrance to the development of national markets and modernization of the state (see UN, 1951, p. 13-15).

Thus, immediately after the war, the American military government sponsored land reforms in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan where the communist-led and inspired tenant unions and peasant struggles were at their peak in the countryside. In all three countries, land reform significantly increased owner-occupancy and reduced tenancy (Tables 1-5). Similarly in Germany and Southern Italy, land was widely redistributed in response to peasant militancy. Southern Italy, the scene of land occupation and confiscation between 1944-1947 and 1949-1950, passed and implemented a series of land reform legislations. Only between 1944 and 1949, that is, before the land reform of 1950 under the Christian Democrats, “by the most conservative figures we have, 1187 cooperatives with a total membership of nearly a quarter of a million took over more than 165,000 hectares of land, mainly in Sicily, Calabria, and Lazxlo” (Ginsborg 1984 p. 94). In Latin America it took years of peasant struggles, and large-scale invasions of land, and political agitation aimed at agrarian change, notably in Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Brazil (Landsberger 1969; Huizer 1972; Stavenhagen 1970; Feder 1971), as well as the Cuban revolution and its sweeping land reform of 1959, before the American-supported agrarian reformist movements produced a serious program (Act of Bogota of 1960 and the Charter of Punta del Este of 1961). Thus, between 1960 and 1964 Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela all enacted new national land reform laws.

The details of these legislations and their processes of implementation are too extensive to discuss here. The outcome varied from place to place, depending on prior political histories and particular balance of class forces. It is important to note, however, that these reforms were more real than cosmetic and in most cases, had far-reaching implications for the future of Third World peasantry. That they came on a “first struggle, first served” basis reveals their essentially conservative character. At the same time, where implemented, they did alter
the structure of national political power and the pattern of landownership in the countryside. As we shall see, this outcome is quite relevant for understanding the particularities of depeasantization between 1945 and 1973.

Three points should be noted here. First, in all cases a very substantial part of the cultivated lands were excluded from reform on the condition that they were mechanized or in the process of modernization. Consistent with import-substitution growth strategies, industrialization of agriculture, production primarily for domestic markets, and export diversification in lieu of primary export specialization (characteristic of the post-1930s era) were promoted through state support policies (Llambi 1990, p. 182). Land concentration and industrialization of agriculture, therefore, were a direct outcome of both reforms and accompanying state policies.

Second, as David Lehman has demonstrated (1982; 1986), in some regions such as northern Ecuador, Argentina Pampas, Southern Brazil (Katzmann 1978), Western Venezuela (Llambi 1989) and northern India the reforms together with both privileged access to advantageous labor markets (Lehman 1982), and state policies that ensured access to credit and marketing (Edelmann 1980) have led to the emergence of several types of capital accumulating family farms (producing overwhelmingly for the market and worked by owners with some hired labor). Importantly, the emergence of capitalized family farms has been limited to a "few places in the underdeveloped world" (Lehman 1982, p. 155), and their profitable operation has
been heavily dependent on state support as well as specialization in the production of particular crops (Llambi 1990, p. 183-4).

Third, and most significant for our purpose, land reforms contributed to a proliferation of small, mostly near subsistence family-sized farm units as a result of either redivision and redistribution of land or settlement of new agricultural frontiers. Although a minority became successful capitalized family farmers, most remained petty commodity producers heavily dependent on state subsidies and public and private financing for their production, and, increasingly, for their consumption needs.

At the same time, as a consequence of deep penetration of commodity relations into the countryside—in part promoted by reforms—small owners became increasingly exposed to (world) market forces, a process that lead to the diversification of their sources of income (e.g., dependence partly on petty commodity production, partly on rural labor markets, partly on seasonal migration as well as occasional wage labor on large and capitalized farms during peak periods, and, more recently, on subcontracting income linked to multinational corporations). For example, the proliferation of small family holdings in Latin America is illustrated in Table 6. Between 1950 and 1980 the number of family farms with an average of about 2 hectares increased by 92 percent. At the same time, the average farm size declined from 2.4 to 2.1 hectares. The dual process of land concentration and deconcentration is reflected in Table 7. In 1980, 22 percent of large commercial farms occupied 82 percent of the total cultivated area, while small family holdings, which made up 78 percent of all farm units, occupied only 18 percent of the land area.

The important point is that between 1945 and 1973, notwithstanding the emergence of capitalized family farms, class differentiation in the countryside, in the sense used by the advocates of the disappearance thesis (e.g., Lenin [1899] 1960), was not the rule, precisely because of the specific global context in which promarket nationalisms were incorporated into the state system. Before discussing this point, however, we need to further specify this global context; this brings us to a characterization of the new international division of labor in food production that emerged in this period. The postwar international food order was constructed

---

**Table 4 • Changes in Taiwanese Land Tenure by Type of Households, 1948-1959**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Owner Farmer Families</th>
<th>% Part Owner-Farmer Families</th>
<th>% Tenant-Farmer Families</th>
<th>% Farm Laborers Families</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chen, 1961, p. 312.

---

**Table 5 • Changes in S. Korean Land Tenure by Type of Households, 1945-1965**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Owner Farmer Families</th>
<th>% Part Owner-Farmers Families</th>
<th>% Tenant-Farmer Families</th>
<th>% Slash &amp; Burn Farmer Families</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---
under the aegis of the American state in a way that advanced its hegemonic position within the emerging-state system. The U.S. aim was twofold: (1) to dispose of the mounting grain surpluses at home and (2) to make the best use of food aid as political leverage in the process of constructing the world market (Friedmann 1982; 1993).

### Table 6 • Number and Average Size of Small Farms in Latin America, 1950-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Farms (millions)</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
<th>Average Farm Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
Adopted from de Janvry, Sadoulet, and Young (1989b, p. 407) and de Janvry, Marsh, Runsten, Sadoulet, and Zabin (1989a, pp. 61-62).

By 1945, the pressure for grain export had found a new political dimension in that the coalition that had brought the New Deal administration to power included the interests of American farmers who successfully lobbied for state and export subsidies (Friedmann 1982). Particularly in the context of rising European protectionism and cold war trade restrictions after the Korean War, food aid sent to the underdeveloped world with the aim of opening markets for U.S. grain surpluses found a prominent place in American global agricultural policies (Cleaver 1977; Friedmann 1982; Tubiana 1989; Nau 1978).

At the same time, food aid facilitated both the project of incorporating promarket nationalisms and the extension of the nation-state system to the former colonies (Friedmann and Michael 1989). For their part, promarket nationalisms, in their quest for achieving national independence—a goal that saw industrialization as its key ingredient—welcomed the emerging new world food order. From the standpoint of the Third World states, it made economic sense to accept U.S. grain either when it came in the form of food aid or as concessional sales at negotiated prices well below the national or world market prices under such terms as “40 years’ credit at 1.3 percent interest” (Tubiana 1989, p. 27). By 1965 more than 80 percent of U.S. wheat exports were financed by food aid. Even when it did not come as aid, the oversupply of subsidized U.S. grain depressed world prices (Friedmann 1982, p. 266). Between 1951 and 1972 low and stable prices of grain on the world market not only discouraged its production in the formerly self-sufficient or surplus-producing regions of the underdeveloped world, but also encouraged the growth of new demand. By 1970 the U.S. share of world export in wheat, maize, and soybeans had increased to 35 percent, 50 percent, and 90 percent respectively (Tubiana 1989, p. 25).

The end result was, first, the internationalization of the American diet (Morgan 1977, p. 120-129) as reflected in the progressive replacement of wheat for rice and corn in Asia and
Latin America (Friedmann 1982, p. 254), wheat or rice for maize in Central America and Egypt, and wheat or rice for millet or sorghum in West Africa (Tubiana 1989, p. 27).

Second, and correlatively, wheat production declined in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America, and in less than twenty-five years, Asia and Latin America, which had been once surplus-producing regions, became deficit regions (Friedmann 1982, p. 264-265). In the underdeveloped world as a whole the ratio of food imports to food exports increased from 50 percent in 1955-1960 to 80 percent in 1975 (Manfredi 1978, p. 16). Thus, as Table 8 clearly demonstrates, between 1960 and 1980 both the rural population as a percentage of total population and the agricultural labor force as a percentage of total labor force declined in all regions of the Third World.

Table 8 • Rural Population and Labor Force in Agriculture, 1960-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage of Rural Population</th>
<th>Percent of Labor Force in Agriculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group I</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western &amp; Eastern</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern &amp; Central</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
* Excluding Cuba
* Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Syria
* Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq
* Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda
* South Africa, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
* Indonesia, South Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand

Third, as a result, the new international division of labor in food production increasingly contradicted the ideal model of inward-oriented national growth that was being advocated by American as well as Third World developmentalist policy-oriented theorists. In the 1960s, particularly, the latter tendency was led by W. W. Rostow in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and by Raul Prebisch (since the 1950s) in the Alliance for Progress. Between the late 1940s and the late 1970s, the very mode on whose basis promarket nationalisms were to be incorporated into the world system became progressively devoid of content. The coincidence of the process of reformation of the world's agricultural "sector" and the process of implementing nation-state oriented developmentalist programs account for the relative rather than absolute decline of the Third World between 1945 and 1975. This is reflected in Table 9, which gives estimates of the deruralization rate for selected countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe, as well as North America and Canada. For each intercensal period, the ratio of the rate of rural out-migration to the rate of rural natural population increase (times 100) reflects a rough estimate of the rate of deruralization. Hence, while a rate of deruralization above 100 percent represents an absolute decline of the rural population in the period.
under consideration, a rate below 100 percent represents a relative decline. Mexico's rate of 55 percent, for example, means that more than half of the rural population growth between 1960 and 1970 was “drained off” as a result of out-migration. Except for Argentina and Chile, all the countries of the underdeveloped world represented in the table experienced a relative decline of their rural populations, increasingly so in the 1960s as compared to the 1950s. The rate of deruralization remained almost constant for the United States, and it increased substantially for Canada in the 1960s. Europe, in contrast, underwent a much larger rural depopulation in the 1960s.

**Table 9 • Deruralization in Selected Countries, 1950-1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Region and Country</th>
<th>Intercensal Period</th>
<th>Rate of Deruralization*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1951-1970</td>
<td>31.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1950-1960</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1950-1961</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961-1971</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1950-1960</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1950-1960</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1952-1960</td>
<td>101.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>167.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1950-1962</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962-1974</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1950-1961</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961-1971</td>
<td>100.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1964-1973</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1950-1963</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1947-1960</td>
<td>138.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1951-1961</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1953-1963</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963-1971</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1961-1974</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1961-1971</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1961-1971</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1955-1960</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1956-1966</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1957-1965</td>
<td>104.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western and Northern Europeb</td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>309.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1951-1961</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961-1971</td>
<td>139.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1950-1960</td>
<td>104.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:

* For each intercensal period, the ratio of the rate of rural out-migration to the rate of rural natural population increase (times 100) reflects a rough estimate of the rate of deruralization.

b Austria, France, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Finland, Norway
Thus, on the one hand, as new peasancies were created, national protection of agriculture through state financing of inputs, price supports, and subsidies slowed down the rate at which naked exposure to market forces would have otherwise undermined the position of millions of small farm owners. On the other hand, the reorganization of world agriculture—to the advantage of U.S. farmers and agribusinesses in the era of U.S. hegemony—redefined the global context and therefore the meaning of nationalist planning. Over time, depending on their social position in the village prior to land redistribution, the location, quality, and amount of the land they acquired, the kinds of crops they cultivated and the level of technology available, and the ecosystems in which they produced (Athreya 1990; Llambi 1989; Llambi and Cousins 1989), some Third World peasants benefited from production under subsidized conditions and consequently became the net buyers of (rural) labor. Most, however, became the net sellers of labor as part-time wagemakers/cultivators, in varying forms and proportions (Singelmann et al 1982; de Janvry et al 1989a; Springborg 1990; Richards and Martin 1983), and increasingly as temporary or permanent urban migrants.  

For the underdeveloped regions, these data are consistent with another study which shows that for Latin America as a whole the size of the peasantry actually increased numerically between 1960 and 1980 (de Janvry et al 1989b, p. 399). A proportion of this growth was, of course, due to natural population increase. More importantly, however, these data characterize a period in which simultaneous processes of peasantization and depeasantization were taking place.  

Thus, contrary to neoclassical views which pose “rural push factors” at the national level and commonly reduce them to factors related to greater density of rural populations, it was the operation of a “global push factor,” that, transmitting its impact through the price form, systematically undermined the ideal as well as the reality of expanding “independent” petty commodity production in the rural Third World—thereby reversing an ongoing process of peasantization. This reversal was mediated by state intervention at the national level, the first consequence of which was a sluggish rate of class differentiation in the rural Third World. The same thing was true for American family farmers of this period, the difference being that the latter were generally prosperous, while the former were generally poor. According to a U. N. estimate, for example, by the late 1970s close to 50 percent of the rural population in Latin America as a whole (76.3 million people), lived in absolute poverty (de Janvry et al 1989a, p. 60). Within the new global order, therefore, the family farmers of the North and those of the South reproduced each other. The second consequence of the global reversal of peasantization, again mediated at the national level by state intervention, was a massive transfer over a period of twenty-five years of the Third World’s rural population to (urban) centers of capital accumulation. This is reflected in Table 10, which gives data for the contribution of rural to urban net migration to the growth of the urban proportion of the population. Thus, where the urban rate of natural increase equals that of the natural rate of population growth the total ratio equals unity, meaning that all of the growth in the urban proportion is attributable to in-migration. A figure above unity indicates that the urban rate of natural increase is slower than the rate of national population growth, while a figure below unity shows a higher contribution of urban natural increase to the growth of urban proportion.  

For the countries for which data are available, Table 10 confirms that virtually all of the growth in the urban proportion of the population is attributable to in-migration (mean, 1960-1970 = 1.11). Table 11 compares rural to urban migration in the underdeveloped world as a whole (1950-1975) with that which occurred earlier (1925 and 1950). Whereas between 1925
Table 10 • Contribution of Rural-Urban Net Migration to Urbanization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Region and Country</th>
<th>Intercensal Period</th>
<th>Contribution of In-Migration to Urban Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1951-1960</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1950-1960</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1950-1961</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1950-1960</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1950-1960</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1952-1960</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1950-1962</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962-1974</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1950-1961</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1964-1973</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1950-1963</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1947-1960</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1951-1961</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961-1971</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1953-1963</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963-1971</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1961-1974</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1961-1971</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1955-1960</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1956-1966</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1957-1965</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


and 1950 only 10 percent of the rural population (100 million people) migrated to the cities, this figure rose to 25 percent in the next twenty-five years, representing an increase of 230 percent in the number of Third World rural migrants.

Table 11 • Rural to Urban Migration in the Underdeveloped World, 1925-1950 and 1950-1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number of People (in millions)</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
<th>% of Rural Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925-1950</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1975</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thus, not only did the internationalization of production and consumption of food operate as a global push factor, it also acted, indirectly, as a “global pull factor,” in the sense that it
helped refine the objective of Third World states from balanced growth to industrialization. The importance of the latter, as both an ideal and a goal that symbolized national independence, was always strongly felt within “promarket” and “socialist” nationalisms (ECLA 1950). But the availability of cheap food at the global level, with its implication for lessening the cost of reproduction of wage labor in national economies, played a role in elevating import-substitution industrialization to its central place in national development planning programs. Indeed, the terms “development” and “industrialization” soon became synonymous.28

In fact, further analysis of data for all of Africa, Asia, and Latin America shows a global pull factor in action. Regrouping the continental data on percentages of rural population and agricultural labor force according to the level of gross national product (GNP) per capita demonstrates that there is a close relationship among these indicators. This is done in Table 12, which shows the inverse relationship between the level of GNP per capita and the percentages of rural population and labor force in agriculture. As the level of GNP per capita rises, rural population and agricultural labor force decline. But the ratio of the percentage of rural population to the percentage of labor force in agriculture rises with increasing levels of GNP per capita, indicating a tendency toward the “urbanization of the countryside.” This brings us to a consideration of the second phase of depeasantization.

Table 12 • Level of GNP/Capita, Rural Population, and Agricultural Labor Force, 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GNP per capita (dollars)</th>
<th>Percentage of Rural Population</th>
<th>Percentage of Labor Force in Agriculture</th>
<th>Ratio of % Rural Population to % Agricultural Labor Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>313</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>953</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2192</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**DENATIONALIZATION AND DEPEASANTIZATION, 1973-1990**

Given the global context, therefore, the contradictions of capitalist development in the South, contrary to Leninist expectations, were manifested as a **strong tendency towards deruralization as opposed to capital accumulation in the countryside**. With increasing intensity, capital and labor found each other in the urban locations, including those fractions of capital and labor that became engaged in producing the means of subsistence. This was related to the international industrialization of agriculture that originated in the United States and was progressively extended to the rest of the world, consequently integrating the sectors of world agriculture (Friedmann and McMichael 1989). On the other hand, the continuing process of international industrialization of world agriculture has caused the progressive blurring of the traditional distinction between urban and rural phenomena based on the exclusive concentration of agricultural productive activities in the latter.29 This is reflected in Table 13, which shows the trend in the Third World toward urbanization of agricultural employment and the expansion over time of nonagricultural activities to rural localities. Thus, as the expansion of relations of real subordination of labor to capital has proceeded in world agriculture, so has the desegregation of urban and rural spaces at the national level. Before we can discuss this,
however, we need to define the new coordinates of global change with reference to the trajectory of the peasancies in the post-1973 period. We are now in a process of transition.

Table 13 • Spatial Integration of Labor in Agriculture and Non Agriculture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Percentage of Urban Labor Force in Agriculture (1)</th>
<th>Percentage of Rural Labor Force Not in Agriculture (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>64.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
Based on data in United Nations (1980); data on Mexico and Brazil from de Janvry et al (1989a).

With the decline of U.S. hegemony after 1973, the world has entered a period of prolonged political and economic crisis during which capital has been reorganizing itself on a global scale. Two important events must be noted: (1) the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, which once symbolized the central place of the American state in the state system, and (2) rapid accumulation, in response to the world economic downturn, of a mass of finance capital that has become increasingly free from national regulation. Thus, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the creatures of the Bretton Woods system, behave in their maturity in ways that betray their “political” independence.

The consolidation of international finance capital—the very outcome of the crisis—is now mediating the globalization of capital. This mediation involves the transnationalization of the state. The latter is a complex and contradictory process in which the world’s public and private financial institutions act as the agents of this transformation (McMichael and Myhre 1991). Although the globalization of the state is a contested terrain, since the early 1980s supranational institutions have successfully linked their lending/aid policies to the implementation of structural reform programs whose central component is divorcing the state from national regulation of capital (Aglietta 1979). It is in this context that import-substitution developmentalism in the Third World has increasingly given way to the so-called outward-oriented or export-led industrialization strategies. Concurrent with this trend has been the revival of postmercantilist/neo-Recardian economic theories that emphatically advocate world
market-oriented specialization as opposed to national developmentalism (Lee 1981; GATT Study Group 1985; Kruegger 1986).

Insofar as the trajectory of the Third World peasantries is concerned, two important consequences of the implementation of deregulationist reforms must be noted. First, where it has been implemented, the outward-oriented strategy has led to drastic cuts in farm subsidies and price supports as well as land market deregulation, wage freezes, and massive devaluation of national currencies (Llambi 1990). The theoretical justification is that these measures will bring about the most efficient allocation of the world's natural and social resources and that this will eventually benefit everyone. In reality, once we remember the social origins of agrarian reformism in the earlier period, it will become clear that nonintervention on the part of the state is in fact a form of intervention, because the existing inequalities of wealth and power will in practice make the rich—rather than the masses of near-subsistence peasants/workers—the main beneficiaries of deregulation. Peasants/workers are especially vulnerable if we consider the fact that they are already heavily dependent on the state for the provision of low-cost credit and chemical, biological, and mechanical inputs (see Roy, Tisdell, Alauddin 1992). Second, the pursuit of export-led growth policies has led to the promotion of capitalist production of cash crops which, on the one hand, is contributing to the decline of the large subsistence sector and is further deepening the Third World's dependency on the world market for basic foods—thereby subjecting millions of people in heavily indebted countries to the vagaries of world market prices—and, on the other hand, is intensifying industrialization of commercial agriculture which is most likely to activate new technological push factors on the Third World countryside (Tubiana 1989, p. 36).

As a countertendency, however, we must note the growth of subcontracting where the large agro-industrial complexes depute parts of the labor process to the peasantry, although even here there is a tendency for subcontracting arrangements to be made with the large or medium capitalized farms (Llambi 1990).

All in all, then, there are reasons to believe that the transition to export-oriented production has accelerated the pace of depeasantization. In fact, a close examination of the available data confirms this view. For comparative purposes, Tables 14 and 15 illustrate the net rural to urban migration in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Third World as a whole during four periods. Table 14 compares the period between 1960 and 1975 with the period between 1975 and 1990. Table 15 uses U.N. population projections to compare the periods 1950-1975 and 1975-2000. My method of calculation controls for the urban natural population increase (described in detail at the foot of Table 14). Both tables demonstrate similar trends. Therefore, I will discuss only Table 14, by noting three observations:

First, as columns 1 and 2 indicate, during the second period in the three continents as a whole and in Asia and Latin America, percentages of both the absolute increase in the urban populations and the increase in the urban population attributable to migration decreased relative to the first period. This is consistent with my earlier remark concerning the relationship between economic growth and the rate of rural to urban migration. That is, as the world economic recession started in the post-1975 period there was a corresponding decrease in the rate of urbanization. Second, if we compare the ratio of the percentage of increase in the net urban in-migration to that of absolute increase in the urban population (column 3) it becomes clear that in the Third World as a whole and in Asia and Latin America this ratio increases significantly, meaning that although the total rate of urbanization has slowed down in the second period compared with the first period the rate of deruralization has accelerated. That
Table 14 • Continental Net Rural to Urban Migration, 1950-1975 and 1975-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>% Actual Increase in Urban Population (1)</th>
<th>% Increase Attributable to Migration (2)</th>
<th>Ratio of Increase due to Migration to Absolute Increase (3) = (2) + (1) × 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Third World</td>
<td>1960-1975</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975-1990</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>1960-1975</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975-1990</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1960-1975</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975-1990</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>87.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1960-1975</td>
<td>101.9</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975-1990</td>
<td>112.4</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
Calculations based on data from United Nations (1988; 1989). For each continent, the actual increase was calculated by subtracting urban population in t₂ from urban population in t₁. Then I calculated the natural increase by multiplying urban population in t₁, by the percentage of natural growth for each period (1960-1975 and 1975-1990). The percentage of natural growth was calculated by multiplying the average annual natural growth rate by the number of years within each period. The figure for natural increase is an estimation of what the growth of urban areas would have been if no in-migration had occurred. Subtracting this from the actual increase gives an estimation of the actual increase due to migration.

is, a higher proportion of the increase in the urban population in the second period is due to rural out-migration than in the first period. Third, only for Africa are there no significant changes in the three proportions between the two periods.

Table 15 • Net Rural to Urban Migration in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Third World, 1950-1975 and 1975-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>% Actual Increase in Urban Population (1)</th>
<th>% Increase Attributable to Migration (2)</th>
<th>Ratio of Increase Due to Migration to Absolute Increase (3) = (2) + (1) × 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Third World</td>
<td>1950-1975</td>
<td>176.3</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975-2000</td>
<td>141.8</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>1950-1975</td>
<td>195.5</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975-2000</td>
<td>110.6</td>
<td>52.98</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1950-1975</td>
<td>153.2</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975-2000</td>
<td>117.1</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1950-1975</td>
<td>218.2</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975-2000</td>
<td>243.8</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:

This may be a result of (1) an exceptionally low rate of economic growth in the second period, relative to Asia and Latin America. The GNP per capita for Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, declined by almost 200 percent between 1980 and 1990. The corresponding figure for Latin America was 86 percent. Africa’s economy declined at a much faster rate in the second period as compared to Asia and Latin America in the same period; or (2) an exceptionally high urban rate of natural population increase in the second period. While in the first period rates of natural population increase in the three continents are relatively close, Africa’s rate in the second period is 57 percent higher than Asia’s, 35 percent higher than Latin America’s, and 42 percent higher than that of the Third World as a whole. Thus, the average annual growth rate of urban areas in Africa between 1970 and 1990 was about 30 to 35
percent higher than those of Asia and Latin America. This is partially due to the fact that urban proportions in Africa have been quite small, so any particular absolute level of urban growth makes a large proportionate contribution to urban population. Africa’s urban population peaked in the period of 1975-1980 while the peak for urban Latin America was in the late 1950s.

What is not reflected in these data is international migration, especially in the second period from Africa and Asia to Europe and from Latin America to the United States. In 1985 alone more than four million Latin Americans migrated to the United States, about half of whom were from Mexico (calculated from data in UN [1990, p. 221]). Table 16 shows migration from Africa, Asia, and Latin America to the main labor-importing countries of Europe. It shows that there were more than 4 million African, Asian, and Latin American migrants in Europe in 1985, an increase of 52 percent from 1970. It is difficult to know the percentages that were of direct rural and urban origins or of indirect rural origins (the recently urbanized peasants); they probably came from Third World cities, although direct migration from the rural periphery to the urban core does occur, as, for example, in the case of Turkish and Kurdish peasants who become wageworkers in Germany and Sweden, or the Latin American peasants who end up in the U.S. labor markets. An in-depth theoretical and empirical treatment of this point lies beyond the scope of this article (see Pellerin 1993). We should, however, note that the process of transnationalization has a spatial dimension leading to a new differentiation of geographical space (Smith 1984). This will have two related consequences: (1) the collapse of the traditional boundary between the nation-state based categories of “rural” and “urban” and, as a result, (2) an increasing difficulty in making a clear-cut distinction between internal and interregional/international migration.

Table 16 • Third World Migration (in Thousands) to the Main Labor-Importing Countries of Europe,* 1970-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region and Country of Origin</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>1355.2</td>
<td>1955.3</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1389.2</td>
<td>2204.6</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td>1195.3</td>
<td>1849.3</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>248.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>2752.2</td>
<td>4186.7</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
* Belgium, France, (West) Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland.

CONCLUSION

In this article, I have focused on the international dimension of depeasantization in the post World War II period. Methodologically, my aim has been to explore the process of transformation of Third World peasantries from a global and historical perspective that emphasizes the interplay among the social, economic, political, and ideological forces at both the local and global levels. Such a perspective allows us to avoid two related problems of sociological analysis: (1) The problem of reification—in our case, the reification of the “peasantry” of the “nation-state” or of the “world system,”31 and (2) teleological assumptions about the nature
Global Depeasantization

and direction of social change (Abrams 1982; Giddens 1984). Thus, rather than posing depeasantization within a continuous and homogeneous temporal context and/or construing it as the empirical manifestation of logical categories, I have attempted to study global depeasantization as a component of a changing international political-economic order. An analysis of the social construction of this order has served as the first step toward a concrete analysis of depeasantization. The adoption of such a framework is useful, for we see only as much as our methodologies allow. As the emerging work in the sociology of world agriculture demonstrates (e.g., Bonnano, Busch, Friedland, Gouveia, and Mingione 1994; Michael 1993, 1994,) going beyond the conceptual impasse that characterizes agrarian studies requires a critical reassessment of late nineteenth-century methods and paradigms. My analysis, I hope, shows that peasants are neither sui generis entities, nor should they be reduced to ideal typical categories. Peasants exist in global social processes that constitute, and are constituted by, other processes of the world political economy.

Linking the changes in the condition of existence of the postwar peasantry to the transformation of the world economy and polity, I distinguish between two phases of global depeasantization. The ensembles of economic, political, and ideological processes within each phase were distinct, as were the corresponding processes of depeasantization. In the first phase, between 1945 and 1973, I show that the simultaneous processes of peasantization and depeasantization led to a relative, rather than an absolute, decline of the Third World peasantry. Rather than offer a teleological or functional account, I explain the peasant trajectory on a world scale in terms of the changing political history of capitalism. I therefore highlight, among other factors, the cold war context, the historical intersection of anticcolonial/nationalist and peasant movements, the rivalry between the American and Soviet models of national industrialization, and the rise to prominence of national-industrialist ideology and practice.

In the second period, between about 1973 and 1990, the pace of depeasantization was accelerated. I link this acceleration with the ongoing transformation of the world economy since the early 1970s. One consequence of globalization, or the process of rationalization of internationalism, has been the weakening of nation-states and their ability, if not their willingness, to regulate national economies. I argue that denationalization, particularly with respect to agriculture, has led to a fast-paced deruralization of the Third World. Against the expectations of the proponents of the persistence thesis, therefore, depeasantization has been a major global process of our time. In contrast to the conclusions of the advocates of the disappearance thesis, depeasantization has been neither a unilinear process, nor has it taken the historically particular form of differentiation in the countrysides within each and every nation-state. The analysis in this article confirms that class formation is an ongoing historical process, "a happening" in E. P. Thompson's (1965, p.357) words that may (increasingly) include a geographical dimension (e.g., Third World peasants/migrants/refugees transforming into city wageworkers elsewhere in the world). Although empirically oriented, studies based on the persistence and disappearance theses have been contextually abstract and therefore miss the connectivity of social phenomena. This article, I hope, provides an alternative.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the valuable comments of Giovanni Arrighi, Terence Hopkins, Philip McMichael, Jodie Manale, Mark Rose, Immanuel Wallerstein and the Sociological Quarterly anonymous reviewers. Many thanks to June Cutright, Linda McDonald, Margie Towery, and Marcela Tribble for their helpful suggestions.

NOTES

1. In the age of globalization, however, such a parochial focus is anachronistic. The Chiapas peasants, for example, have already linked their own circumstances with the changes in the global economy (Cooper 1994; Fox 1994, p. 32).
2. There are exceptions, but these are case studies. See, for example, Peltonen (1993) and Roseberry (1982).
3. Note the similarity between the gemeinschaft and gesellschaft dichotomy and the postwar developmentalist (modernization and neo-Marxist) literature’s celebrated concepts of development and underdevelopment (and their derivatives: developing, more developed, undeveloped, underdeveloped, less developed, backward, etc.). See Araghi 1988.
4. Sociological functionalism conceptualized differentiation as functional (e.g., Comte 1896; Durkheim 1960; Parsons 1966; Eisenstadt, 1968).
5. In contrast, the Mensheviks, carrying the developmentalist logic to its conclusion, argued that a socialist revolution had to wait until capitalism had done its work on the peasantry.
6. Atiur Rahman, for example, explicitly acknowledges that his research “makes an attempt to apply the principal hypotheses of [the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century] debate to rural Bangladesh” (1986, p. v). Similarly, Jairus Banaji (1990, p. 296) writes, in connection with the Indian debate, that the “relevance of The Agrarian Question is certainly as great today as it was when Kautsky published his book.” I advance two arguments against the validity of such an effort: (1) the original disappearance thesis, as we have seen, was in part a product of the culture of modernity and (2) it was meant to analyze an altogether different ensemble of world-historical phenomena.
7. De Janvry, however, has made a valuable contribution to our understanding of the Latin American peasantries. Of particular importance is his attention to the role of the state and its food policies.
8. Bernstein’s (1979, p. 436) concept of “wage labor equivalent” avoids the reductionism of Banaji and Brass. Nation-state orientation is, however, the main problem with Bernstein’s analytical framework. The latter is overcome in Roseberry (1982).
9. In formulating his views against the populists, Plekhanov ([1885] 1961; [1895] 1972) resolved the tension between Marx’s open-ended historical sociology and his progressionism to the advantage of the latter. Plekhanov’s work influenced a generation of Russian Marxists.
10. Such a historical reading would make sense of Chayanov’s otherwise inexplicable assumptions (e.g., the impossibility of vertical concentration of peasant production through market and financial structures, the domination of use value over exchange value on the countryside, and the unlimited supply of land).
11. I take exception to some of their arguments.
12. Elsewhere I have documented the explicitly stated viewpoints of this current (Araghi, 1991).
13. There were debates on this issue in the 1920s and 1930s within the CPSU, but the debates were not on the role of the peasantry; they addressed the role of the national bourgeoisie. The nationalist element in this formulation was emphasized at the expense of its socialist content in the Stalin era.
14. “the Russian Marxists . . . committed the following mistakes: instead of applying the theory of Marx to the special conditions prevailing in Russia . . . they uncritically repeated the conclusions drawn from the application of Marx’s theory to foreign conditions, to a different epoch,” (Lenin [1907] 1971c, p. 161). “The main task is to instill political consciousness into the peasant movement . . . Our program, for instance, declares that we recognize the right of nations to Self-determination” ([1905] 1971b, p. 89).
15. As a U.S. official put it in 1960, "We can look at Mexico today and thank the Lord the revolution occurred and matured before Sino-Soviet imperialism had become militant and powerful" (Mallory 1960, p. 820). But my survey of U.S. official documents indicates that all references to the role of the peasantry in the Mexican revolution of 1910 appear after the Cuban revolution of 1959. See also the statement by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin Martin (1963, p. 960).

16. As Carl Rowan (1962, p. 379), the deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs put it in 1962, "It would have been nice if the United States and Latin American leaders had found before now the coincidence of events and vision to which we have now come. Unfortunately, however, the example of Cuba was needed first."

17. The expansion of "state" nationalisms, of course, meant the restriction of the political and commercial space of the global free enterprise system.

18. I have developed this argument elsewhere (Araghi 1991). See also Clairmonte (1986).

19. It was not an accident that the most coherent statement of this ideology was put forward by an Argentinean economist/politician, Raul Prebisch. Eastern Europe in the interwar period underwent a similar inward-oriented growth, giving rise to a similar theoretical reformulation there. Joseph Love (1980) shows that Prebisch was familiar with, and possibly influenced by, the East European literature.

20. Here the stated goals of land redistribution coincided with those of the Green Revolution (i.e., attempts at increasing the productivity of agriculture in Third World economies through the introduction of improved grain varieties, heavy fertilizer usage, and carefully controlled irrigation).


22. In the Third World, as Rostow put it, "agricultural production has not expanded in such a way as to take advantage for the possibilities not merely for providing for the rapidly growing cities but for providing agricultural raw materials for industry and export" (1963b, p. 310); he therefore advocated a "build up of agricultural productivity" (1964, p. 180). Interestingly, in the same year, Oliver Freeman, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, was strongly advocating the expansion of American agricultural export to the Third World. See Freeman, 1964, (pp. 384-386).

23. On the other hand, Canada's rate of about 140 percent between 1961 and 1971 indicates that the total size of the rural population actually declined (i.e., the rural population experienced a negative growth rate).

24. I should note here that in the postwar period, depeasantization affected different types of peasantries. There are, of course, cases that make generalizations difficult. This article is not intended to substitute more detailed (but globally informed) historical studies. See Araghi (1987).

25. This is not to deny that high population density may also play a role. But in many countries of Middle and South America, as well as Africa, high rates of migration persist despite low rural population densities. Certainly in North America and Europe, population pressure has not played a role in recent experiences of deruralization.

26. I cannot pursue this point here further, but compare this historical/relational account of the survival of family farms to post-Chayanovian logical analyses.

27. This is defined as:

\[ \text{nm} = \frac{U}{U + (P - N)} \]

Where:

\( \text{nm} = \text{Contribution of rural-urban net migration to the urban population} \)

\( U = \text{Urban rate of in-migration} \)

\( P = \text{Urban rate of natural increase} \)

\( N = \text{National rate of natural increase} \)

28. At the same time, emphasis on industrialization dovetailed with the project of expanding the social base of the U.S. hegemony as well as with the "outward-directed" expansion of metropolitan capitals.
29. Raymond Williams (1973, pp. 299-302), for example, mistakes "work on the land" with food production. This is despite his otherwise insightful analysis.

30. Debt and depeasantization are linked. The countries that have relatively well-protected agricultures are also the most heavily indebted ones: Mexico with a total external debt of $107 billion, Brazil with $124 billion, India and South Korea with $46 and $40 million debts respectively (World Bank 1989).

31. As an intellectual undertaking in the era of industrialism and nationalism, late nineteenth-century social science was (a) evolutionist and (b) took the nation-state for granted. Although the world system theory has challenged the latter assumption, it has inherited the former.

32. Weber has warned us not to hypothesize ideal types ([1903-1917] 1949, pp. 90-103). Indeed, all historical queries would be superfluous if theory and history directly coincided.

33. In the 1990s, deruralization is being extended to the former Second World.

34. Of course, there are more connections to be made that lie beyond the purview of this article. Of importance is the utility of global depeasantization as a concept linking rural and urban studies (e.g., see Sinclair 1991 and Roberts 1978), and as a concept relevant for the study of world hunger (e.g., see Lappé and Collins 1986), Third World homelessness (e.g., Eyre 1990; "World's Growing Slum Cities," 1994), the development of new social movements (Cooper, 1994; Fox 1994), fundamentalism (e.g., see Araghi 1989), and urban unrest (e.g., see Walton and Seddon 1994). Massive and rapid rural to urban population transfers in the Third World have resulted in an unprecedented rise in what we may call "global homelessness" and "global hunger." At the same time, the availability of a surplus of wageworkers has contributed to the flight of core capitals to the Third World with important consequences: deindustrialization, declining wages, and a weakening of the power of organized labor. Deindustrialization and urban decay in the core, overurbanization in the Third World, and rising levels of homelessness and hunger on a worldwide scale are ultimately related to global depeasantization. By 2000, 17 of the 20 most populated agglomerations in the world will be located in the Third World. Meanwhile, Brazil's and Thailand's most productive lands will produce a million tons of soybeans and cassava: cash crop animal feeds for use in intensive livestock production in the North. Laurance Tubiana (1989, p. 36) has suggested that the new role of Third World agricultural economies as the supplier of animal feeds to the North "is accompanied by a decline in food consumption, the creation of food deficits, and the greater dependence of Third World Countries." Kenya and Botswana, for example, are major beef exporters to Europe. And Lesotho has become a major exporter of asparagus, while its people suffer from severe malnutrition (see Cheru 1989; Hollist and Tullis 1987; Wisner 1989). Will depeasantization lead to a new wave of peasant resistance movements? The 1994 Zapatista uprising in Mexico indicates that the students of social movements should further explore this question.

REFERENCES


Rowan, Carl T. 1962. “New Directions in Foreign Policy.” *Department of State Bulletin* March 5, 378-381.


